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Post-war processes of European integration have carried significant implications for how 
states and societies interact to shape international politics (Risse-Kappen 1995).With 
governments having displayed – until recently – a growing readiness to devolve power both 
upwards and downwards since 1945, new space has been opened up for transnational social 
movements working in various fields (environmental protection, public health, human rights, 
non-discrimination, and others) that are today routinely associated with ‘positive conceptions 
of what justice and democracy require’(Bauböck 2000: 12-13). Consequently, non-
governmental actors, long ignored by political scientists as ‘not powerful in the classic sense 
of the term’, have started to be viewed as ‘important sources of new ideas, norms, and 
identities in the international system’, capable not only of influencing policy outcomes, but 
also of transforming the terms and nature of debate (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Indeed, the 
2007 Lisbon Treaty of the European Union directly acknowledged the importance of 
transnational societal activism through its introduction of a new mechanism for ‘direct 
democracy’ in the form of the European Citizens Initiative (ECI).1 
Yet, the plethora of studies produced in this area over recent years has so far 
conspicuously overlooked the work of transnational social movements lobbying for stronger 
international legal guarantees of minority rights.
2
The current article addresses this gap by 
analysing the activity of two interlinked transnational minority coalitions – the interwar 
European Nationalities Congress (ENC, 1925-1938) and the present-day Federal Union of 
European Nationalities (FUEN, estd.1949). Most existing accounts of these organisations 
reflect a still-dominant view of ethnically-based mobilisation as inherently particularistic, 
inimical to stability and integration, and thus not a transnationalism that promotes "good" 
causes (Risse-Kappen1995: 4). Recalling that the ENC was ultimately subverted by Nazi 
currents amongst German minorities,historical studies typically start from the 1930s and 
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work backwards, characterising this organisation as a body where “national interests and not 
common interests of minorities as such formed the true basis of membership” (Arendt  2009 
[1951]: 274). In this regard, the central role played by German minorities has encouraged the 
view that, from the very outset, the ENC was never more than a Trojan horse for revisionist 
nationalism (Bamberger-Stemann 2000).The 1930s have in turn cast a long shadow over the 
ENC’s self-professed successor,FUEN, an umbrellafor ethnic groups in Europe 
encompassingtoday 90 member organisations in 32 countries.Very few people, however, will 
be familiar with its name, whileexisting studies often portray FUEN’s activism as an 
unwelcome reminder of one of the darkest chapters in human history (Salzborn 2005).  
The current article refutes this wholly negative characterisation. Based on extensive 
archival research, it demonstrates that during the mid-late 1920s, the ENC embodied a 
genuine transnationalism serving as a rallying point for a group of democratically-minded 
political activists whose programme anticipated contemporary principles of liberal pluralism, 
multiculturalism and interculturalism. Well ahead of their own time, these activists were also 
far-sighted advocates of supranational European integration.Yet, their contribution in this 
area is also overlooked,leading one author to characterise them as ‘forgotten 
Europeans’(Hiden 2004: 250).It is in light of the 1920s, we argue, that one should view the 
continuity between the ENC andFUEN, an organisation which has embraced principles of 
pluralist democracy and European unity.  
The longevity of the transnational minority rights activism embodied by the ENC and 
FUEN highlights the perennial challenge of accommodating ethno-cultural diversity faced by 
practically all European states, as well as the continued failure to develop a robust 
international minority rights regime to which all states should adhere.  
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The ENC, for instance, arose in response to the first concerted effort to 
internationalise minority rights, at a time when the creation of new national minorities in the 
successor states of Central and Eastern Europe placed ethno-political issues at the very centre 
of the international agenda. Minority Treaties provided for non-discrimination on ethnic 
grounds and recognition of minority cultures, establishing a system of minority protection 
under the League of Nations (LoN). The overall failure of this effort, and the subsequent 
horrors that befell Europe discredited the very concept of minority rights, which was almost 
entirely marginalised within the post-1945 international order. The architects of this order 
believed that universal guarantees of individual human rights would serve to deliver equality 
and dignity for all, majorities and minorities alike. Ethnic identities and ethnic-based claims 
within nation-states were expected to disappear as part of the onward march of 
modernisation.
3
 The formation of FUEN as early as 1949 gave lie to this assertion, which was 
further undermined by a new surge of “mobilised communalism” in Western societies from 
the early 1960s and – definitively - by the revival of minority claims in Central and Eastern 
Europe following post-1989democratisation (Young 1983).
4
 
The latter development in particular hastened efforts to create new minority rights 
standards that had already begun to take shape during the 1980s through the Human 
Dimension of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (Burgess 1999). The 
subsequent period has brought significant progress in this area, above all through the creation 
of the post of High Commissioner for National Minorities at the OSCE, the drafting of the 
Council of Europe (CoE) Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
(FCNM) and the inclusion of ‘respect for and protection of minorities’ amongst EU 
membership criteria in 1993.
5
Documents produced by international organisations working in 
this field have been able to draw upon existing examples of good practice within Western 
democracies, which have gradually moved towards a more liberal pluralist conception of 
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political community. Within this international context, FUEN was – after four decades of 
concerted lobbying – finally granted consultativestatus at CoE (1989) and the United 
Nations(1995), as well as later becoming a participant in the Fundamental Rights Platform 
maintained by FRA.  
For all of this, however, current international minority rights norms have not gone 
beyond ‘minimum standards’that are ‘ambiguously formulated’, reflecting the interplay of 
different state actors with different agendas(Dembinska et al. 2014: 356; Kymlicka 2008:44). 
In the area of cultural reproduction above all, states have zealously guarded their sovereignty, 
even as they have devolved it in other areas (Csergő 2007; Vizi 2014). There is a by now 
well-established scholarly tradition presenting minority rights as a logical extension of liberal 
democracy and a broader framework of human rights (Kymlicka 1995, 2001; Miller 1995, 
2000; Nimni 2005, 2008; Parekh 2000; Stroschein 2015; Tamir 1993). All the same, the 
worldwide resurgence of ethnically-based activism over the past five decades is still 
frequently cast as a “subversive tendency challenging the dominant architecture of the 
[nation-] state system”(Bauböck 2000: 12-13).6 The catastrophic events of the 1930s, when 
minority issues were hijacked by the Nazis, and the more recent ethnic conflicts in parts of 
the former Socialist bloc (above all, in former Yugoslavia) have reinforced a view of 
minorities as an anomaly within the modern state system, to be considered primarily through 
the lens of security.  
FUEN has, since its inception, sought to turn this argument on its head. Framing the 
minority question in terms of democracy and social justice, it argues that by accommodating 
the diverse identities of all their inhabitants, states enhance rather than undermine their 
security, integrity and cohesion. FUEN emerged in direct response to the establishment of the 
CoE and the dawn of the post-war European federalist movement, both of which aimed to 
rebuild, on democratic foundations, a continent shattered by extreme nationalism. FUEN 
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insists that minority communities should have an autonomous collective voice in this 
process.
7
It has welcomed the renewed international attention given to minority rights since 
the early 1990s. However, FUEN characterises the instruments adopted over the past 25 years 
as aneffort to “buy off” minority claims in the interests of states, rather than a genuine 
attempt to extend the EU’s motto of “united in diversity” to encompass all of its cultures.8 
Revisiting the longer-term development of transnational activism is both necessary 
and timely given FUEN’s recent deployment of the ECI mechanism to submit proposals for a 
‘Minority Rights Safepack’ thatcalls for new Commission directives obliging member states 
to enact firmer legal guarantees in this area. The Commission initially rejected the 
Initiative,but this decision has since been successfully challenged through the European Court 
of Justice, and the process of collecting one million signatures began in June 2017.
9
 
Regardless of the eventual outcome, this initiative has already served to increase the visibility 
of transnational minority rights activism. In what follows, we trace the background to the 
ongoing transnational campaign for an enhanced European minority rights regime. We begin 
by exploring the founding ideals of the ENC, before showing how these were revived by 
FUEN within the very different setting of post-war Europe. By way of conclusion, we 
reflecton what lessons might be learned from the past century of transnational minority 
activism today, at a time when growing nationalism and security concerns again threaten the 
entire basis of the European project.  
 
‘On Their Own Behalf’: The European Nationalities Congress 
 
The negative view ofthe ENC held by most historians derives largely from its origins in a 
prior initiative by German minority organisations in Central and Eastern Europe, which in 
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1922 had come together to create the Verband der deutschenMinderheiten Europas 
(Association for German Minorities in Europe – hereafter Verband). Its main architect, Ewald 
Ammende from Estonia, soon after became instrumental in establishing the wider Congress, 
and served as its General Secretary from 1925 until his death in 1936. German activists 
would constitute by far the largest group within the Congress throughout its existence, and 
funding provided by the German Foreign Ministry to the Verband could be channelled into 
the wider organisation to support its activity.
10
 
In the problematic European context bequeathed by World War I and the peace 
settlements, it is hardly surprising that an initiative launched on this basis met with 
widespread suspicion. This was especially so in Poland and other Central and East European 
states containing German minorities that had until recently formed part of the Reich. Here, 
any talk of minority autonomy was viewed as a likely prelude to an irredentist movement 
(Chu 2012: 92-95).Yet, it would be wrong to retrospectively draw a line of continuity 
between the foreign policy aims of Nazi Germany and those of the Weimar Republic and to 
assert that the Nationalities Congress was conceived of by its founders solely as a vehicle for 
revisionist German nationalism. For Ammende, the Verband was always envisaged as a pilot 
project for a wider endeavour – to create a forum within which all of Europe’s national 
minorities could explore their common interests, share experiences and develop perspectives 
on minority rights “from below”.11This goal was directly inspired by the new opportunity 
structures arising from the Minority Treaties and LoN protection procedures, which provided 
the main focus and institutional framework for the ENC activism. While a majority of 
delegates represented German and Jewish organisations,
12
the ENC bore the hallmarks of a 
genuinely multi-ethnic coalition during its early years.
13
 
Moreover, while some of the German representatives were undoubtedly motivated by 
pragmatic considerations, the most influential among them did not place German interests 
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above those of other minorities. Here, particular mention should be made of the ENC co-
founder, Latvian-German Paul Schiemann, who was later dubbed the “thinker of the 
European minorities movement”(Hiden 2004: 127). Schiemann advocated freedom of ethno-
cultural affiliation for each individual, as well as the right to preserve and develop the chosen 
culture in association with others. He saw no inherent contradiction between identification 
with a particular ethno-cultural community and belonging to an overarching, state 
community, the needs of which had to take precedence.
14
What Schiemann rejected was the 
nation-state model predicated on congruence between national and political boundaries; 
instead, he re-conceptualised the state as a “shared territorial space” inhabited by 
autonomously organised ethno-national communities. Thus, Schiemann vociferously 
denounced Nazism from its very inception, seeing it as completely at odds with his own 
advocacy of limiting the absolute sovereignty of states in the interests of building a future 
“United States of Europe”. Nobody, according to Schiemann, was as committed to the 
European project and the elimination of war as national minorities, who were “good 
Europeans because of their fate”(Hiden 2004: 225). 
The universalism of Schiemann’s vision was reflected in the founding principles of 
both the Verband and ENC. Theformer, for instance, explicitly forbade any discussion of 
border revisions, while requiring participants to declare loyalty to their statesof residence, and 
stipulating that the connection between German minorities and the German state that the 
Verband intended to foster was exclusively cultural and without any political connotations. 
Similarly, the ENC followed strict rules of engagement during its sessions: discussion was 
limited to general principles of concern to all minorities; participants were required to declare 
loyalty to their countries of residence; and any accusations directed at individual governments 
were prohibited.
15
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In sum, the ENC aimed at giving agency and voice to the minorities themselves. The 
German activists meeting in Geneva were working “on their own behalf”, to promote their 
own interests rather than those of their “external homeland” (Housden 2014). Revealingly, 
the establishment of the ENC was at first actively opposed by German diplomats, who, 
anxious to smooth the way for Germany’s entry into the LoN, feared that a grassroots 
initiative might cause problems. They soon changed their minds, realising that the key 
founders of the ENC were not in the least inclined towards Pan-Germanism, which would 
also be kept in check by the other ethnic groups present.
16
 This change of attitude can be seen 
partly as pragmatic, in so far as Germany had realised the potential advantages of working 
with an organisation claiming to speak for 40 million Europeans belonging to national 
minorities, with ethnic Germans at the helm. The fact remains, however, that in the late 
1920s, there was no contradiction between the goals of the ENC and those of a German state 
seeking to re-join the international community via the LoN.  
While the ENC delegates assembled in Geneva expressed their commitment to 
working with the League, their experiences at home had taught them that its vision of 
minority rights was ill-suited to the culturally pluralistic environment they lived in.
17
The 
Minority Treaties, for instance, did not provide for any meaningful minority self-governance 
or voice in cultural affairs. Minorities’ fears that the state structures put in place by the 
Treaties would result in forcible assimilation were hardly assuaged by statements from within 
the LoN portraying recognition for minority cultures as merely a transitional phase on the 
road to constructing more “complete” nation-states patterned on those in Western Europe 
(Smith & Hiden 2012: 22).This approach was also reflected in the LoNminority protection 
procedures, which “scrupulously respected and safeguarded” the sovereignty of states 
belonging to the organisation (Crols 2005: 188).
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To remedy these perceived shortcomings, the ENC called for the creation of a 
Standing Committee of Minorities at the League, and the replacement of the existing 
Minority Treaties by a genuinely pan-European guarantee of minority rights.
18
 This was to be 
based on the model of non-territorial cultural autonomy (NTA) devised by the Austrian 
Social Democrats at the turn of the 20
th
 century. Carried through World War I via the 
advocacy of transnational organisations such as the Committee of Jewish Delegations and the 
Central Organisation for a Durable Peace, this model later provided the basis for a unique law 
on minority cultural self-government adopted in Estonia in 1925 and promptly implemented 
by its German and Jewish minorities (Smith 2005: 217). For the Estonian-German Ammende 
(and his fellow activists Paul Schiemann and Max Laserson from neighbouring Latvia), NTA 
provided an obvious platform for the ENC: as well as challenging divisive nationalist claims 
to exclusive ownership of particular territories by a single ethno-cultural group, it also 
helpeddispel suspicions that minority autonomy would undermine the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of states(Ammende 1925, Germane 2013, 2017). 
Despite Ammende and Schiemann’s standing within the ENC, uniting the disparate 
groups represented there behind a shared platform proved difficult, if not impossible. 
Ammende and Schiemann’s advocacy of NTA reflected their belonging to the small and 
territorially dispersed Baltic German community. In this, they found support from Jewish 
minority spokesmen, but less from Sudeten Germans, who, as a large and closely settled 
group, favoured territorial autonomy.
19
 It is therefore significant that an initial ENC agenda 
driven by Baltic German Auslandsdeutschen (ethnic Germans inhabiting states far removed 
from Germany itself) did not always accord with the perspectives of Grenzlanddeutsch 
communities living compactly and contiguously to the German Reich - the Sudeten Germans, 
but also the Germans in the Polish Corridor. Even if the leaders of these communities 
eschewed active consideration of border revision during the 1920s, their advocacy of 
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territorial autonomy was inevitably perceived as an incitement to territorial violation by new 
unitary states that would accept no limitation on or division of their sovereignty (See 
Ammende 1925; Germane 2013, 2017). 
The divergent perspectives and agendas advanced by different organisations within 
the ENC undermined its credibility in the eyes of the LoN Minority Secretariat. In a special 
1931 report – commissioned after persistent lobbying from Ammende – League 
representative Ludvig Krabbe claimedthe ENC had failed to present a convincing case for 
applying NTA beyond Estonia. Krabbe’s closing argument, that a spirit of tolerance and 
liberalism would hardly be encouraged by institutionalising separation between groups, 
signalled his principled rejection of autonomy and his continued adherence to the unitary 
nation-state model.
20
 
By this time, the League, once the greatest source of hope for the ENC activists, had 
become an object of considerable frustration. In 1928-29, statesmen in the League had taken 
up the minorities’ case and, with Gustav Stresemann, Germany’s liberal foreign minister, 
championing change, a special commission headed by the representative for Japan, 
Mineichiro Adachi (also Mineitciro Adatci), was created to investigate how to improve the 
system of minority protection.
21
 However, strong opposition to changes on the part of states 
bound by international agreements meant that Adachi’s final report ‘did not make happy 
reading for the minorities’(Housden 2014: 206). 
The LoN framework may have had more room for growth and development had it not been 
for the deeply problematic overall international environment bequeathed by the post-World 
War I peace settlements; these in fact provided no firm basis for lasting stability in Europe, 
and the limited progress achieved towards this end during the mid-late 1920s was quickly 
derailed following the onset of the Great Depression in 1929. In this context, the task of 
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building a functioning transnational minority coalition through the Congress was further 
complicated by inter-state disputes. One factor especially detrimental to this aim was the 
friction between Germany and Poland, which was at the root of a decision by all Polish 
minority representatives to leave the Congress in 1927.
22
 
This meant that the ENC leader Ammendewas required to swing not just two ways, 
i.e. between the interests of German minorities within the Verband and those of other 
European minorities, but three: he also had to balance the interests of the German state, while 
at the same time accounting for the interests of other states, some of them hostile to Germany. 
This extremely complicated situation was further compounded by different interests cutting 
across and through different national minority groups. Following the LoN’s refusal to reform 
its protection procedures in 1929, German minorities began to think less in terms of 
international solutions to the minority question and more in terms of national, partial and 
partisan solutions. Hence, they increasingly looked to the German state for patronage – a 
trend that proved disastrous given the death of Stresemann in 1929 and the gradual rise of 
National Socialism.
23
 
Once Hitler came to power in January 1933, German minorities only experienced 
heightened pressure to conform to German state policy. This spelled an end to any lingering 
hopes that the ENC might become an effective and independent non-governmental forum 
representing all European minorities (Housden 2014; Nesemann 2007).Matters reached crisis 
point at the ENC annual meeting in September that same year. With anti-Semitic persecution 
already being unleashed in Germany, Jewish minority leaders called upon the ENC to break 
with precedent and issue an explicit condemnation of the Nazi regime and its policies. 
Despite finding some support amongst non-German representatives (most notably ethnic 
Hungarians), this demand was not accepted. In light of this, Jewish representatives refused to 
attend any further ENC meetings of the Congress,
24
 while Schiemann also broke with the 
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organisation as well as with the Verband. Although the ENC would still convene until 1938, 
it de facto became a front organisation for the Verband, where, by the mid-1930s, the 
previous Baltic German leadership had given way to dominance by Sudeten Germans already 
firmly under the sway of Nazism.
25
 
There are many reasons why the ENC failed to deliver upon the aspirations it had set 
in 1925. The diverse array of minorities represented, coupled with the competing interests 
found within each separate minority “field”, made it difficult to attain consensus on anything 
more than the most general principles. This was compounded by the asymmetry between a 
“strong” German minority grouping backed by an external homeland and smaller, less 
organised and less well-resourced groups that often felt they were simply being “pulled 
along” by German interests.26The organisation’s growing dependence on Germany has – 
unsurprisingly – formed a central focus for most historians who have written on the topic. 
Yet, while this dependence would fatally undermine the original ideals of the ENC once the 
Nazis came to power, it did not in itself prejudice the integrity and autonomy of the 
minorities movement during 1926-1932, when Germany was working within the framework 
of the LoN and (under Stresemann in particular) used its weight to ensure that all minorities 
got “a good hearing”(Janowsky 1945). 
The overall failure of the international minority rights movement during this period is 
inseparable from the inadequacies of the LoN framework and – by extension - the overall 
fragility of interwar international environment that was still dominated by the sovereign 
nation-state. The continued inter-state disputes that so undermined the League also left their 
mark on the ENC, as did the tendency of individual states to exploit divisions among 
minorities by adopting restrictive measures toward some communities (or factions within 
them), whilst treating others preferentially.
27
While the Minority Treaties and the LoN created 
a structure of opportunity for the advancement of minority causes, this rested on shaky 
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foundations. In this situation, the limited (and unevenly distributed) resources available to 
minorities invited undue influence by governments increasingly committed to defending the 
interests of “their own”. 
 
 
The Federal Union of European Nationalities: Against the Grain 
 
Although the failure of the LoN minority protection system was only one of the many factors 
that contributed to the start of World War II, the conflict served to bring the entire concept of 
minority rights into disrepute (Claude 1955: 108). The designers of the post-war world thus 
contrived – as Hanna Arendt had suggested already in 1940 - to “throw the baby out with the 
bathwater”.28 Blueprints for the post-bellum European and global order had initially 
includedvarious proposals on improving the League’s internationalised minority rights 
regime.
29
 Considerations of Realpolitik, however, ultimately prevailed. With the Allies keen 
to discard a minority rights doctrine that infringed on state sovereignty, the principal 
international legal documents that emerged from the war, such as the Charter of the United 
Nations (1945), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and The European 
Convention on Human Rights (1953)referred only to individual human rights, including the 
right to non-discrimination on ethnic grounds (Mazower 2004). 
While minority issues did not magically disappear, they were de facto de-
internationalised and relegated back to nation-states, which employed, in their solution, a 
combination of population transfersand both bilateral and unilateral agreements. Most notable 
amongst the latter were the autonomous rights granted to German-speakers in South Tyrol 
under the 1946 Gruber-De Gasperi Agreement, and the set of arrangements in the Danish-
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German borderlands later formalised by the Bonn-Copenhagen declarations of 1955. Both of 
these cases had the important role of demonstrating that ethno-territorial disputes could be 
accommodated through bilateral treaties.
30
It is no coincidence that actors from the two 
regions concerned would become instrumental in the establishment and development of 
FUEN.  
More broadly, the end of the war brought forth – at least in Western Europe - a shared 
commitment to rebuilding a shattered continent on democratic foundations, as embodied by 
the establishment of the Council of Europe in 1949. The subsequent foundation of the 
European Community during the 1950s was also widely understood as signalling a 
recognition that the indivisibly sovereign nation-state had had its day and that a new approach 
based on supranational integration coupled with administrative decentralisation within states 
was required(Unwin 2014).  
These developments provided the formative context for FUEN, which emerged out of 
a Congress of European Regions held in Paris in April 1949 under the presidency of Henri 
Brugmans, head of the Union of European Federation (est. 1946) and Vice President of the 
European Movement. Initiated by French federalists, the Congress was not concerned with 
minority rights per se, but sought rather to promote regions and communities as the building 
blocks of a new, decentralised Europe. The delegates nevertheless included representatives 
both of regions (e.g. Bavaria, Baden) and ethnic communities, (e.g. Bretons, Basques and 
Catalans). The leading figures at the Congress came from diverse political backgrounds: from 
the left-oriented “unrelenting federalist” Italian Altiero Spinelli, who would later become 
widely regarded as one of the founding fathers of the European Union, to the Danish 
conservative politician and later Foreign Minister, Ole Bjorn Kraft. The federalist Joseph 
Martray from Brittany was elected as Secretary General. Federalists and minorities had one 
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important agenda in common: both aimed at bypassing the constraints of the nation-state 
within a new European political order. 
A second gathering, held in Versailles in November 1949, was correspondingly 
entitled the Second Congress of European Minorities and Regions. But, while the final 
resolutions of this meeting reflected the views of both constituencies
31
, it also underlined that 
those with a specific interest in minority rights did not always see eye-to-eye with regionalists 
and federalists.
32Whereas minorities’ keenest interests were in protection under international 
law and the issue of self-determination, the federalists largely concentrated on European 
decentralisation, above all economic. In the end, the 2
nd
 Congress resulted in the formation of 
two organisations: a Federal Union of European Minorities and Regions, and a Federal 
Council of European Minorities and Regions; the two, however, remained closely linked and 
Martray retained the position of Secretary General in both. 
Minorities and federalists were unanimous in professing their dedication to the idea of 
European unity. In Martray’s words: “Our aim is not to divide Europe still further, but to 
create a united Europe on Federal principles. In this task the small people have a special part 
to play, as they are more sensitive than the great centralised states to the idea of European 
Unity” (Kühl 2000: 25).Accordingly, Martray and his colleagues began to lobby the newly-
formed Council of Europe, seeking consultative status and the addition of specific minority 
rights clauses to the 1950 European Convention of Human Rights.
33
 They could also see the 
obvious applicability of the regional framework for meeting the requirement of national 
minorities where these constituted a local majority within a particular sub-state region, with 
South Tyrol providing a working template. When it came to more territorially dispersed 
minorities, the arrangements emerging in the Danish-German borderlands also offered a more 
promising way forward.  
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The Danish minority in South Schleswig indeed proved pivotal both in changing the 
focus of the organisation from regionalist to minority issues and in shaping its general 
guiding principles. The decisive shift came at FUEN’s third Congress, held in Copenhagen in 
1951. According to Kühl, “the issue of the Danes in Germany was at that time of great 
interest in Danish public opinion”, and “without the active and high-level participation of the 
leaders of the Danish minority, the congress would have been a failure from the beginning” 
(Kühl 2000: 37).As a result, minority representatives dominated the Congress, with the 
regionalist founding fathers notably absent (Kühl2000: 40). A special commission tasked 
with exploring the Schleswig Question gave rise to a resolution deemed applicable to all 
European minorities. These included freedom of conscience, the right of parents to decide for 
their children, the right to free speech, and the right to self-determination (hitherto considered 
a taboo by the Congress’ leaders). The resolution also demanded the creation of a European 
Court to resolve disputes between states and their minorities, to which not only states, but 
also individuals, groups and organisations would have the right to appeal.
34
 
The Third Congress heralded a period of Danish minority leadership within FUEN 
that lasted until the mid-1980s. The close connection to the main Danish minority 
organisation SydlesvigskForening (South-Schleswig Association), it is said, “kept the Union 
going” during the difficult years prior to its official recognition by European structures 
(Kühl2000: 103). The prominence of the “Danish question” on the FUEN agenda, despite the 
presence of much larger minorities such as the West Frisians, Bretons, Catalans, Basques and 
Welsh, was particularly striking. In 1951 Martray resigned as secretary general of the Federal 
Council, and was replaced by the Dane Povl Skadegård, upon whose initiative the Council 
and the Union were merged to form the Federal Union of European Nationalities and Regions 
(FUENR). Although the interests of the regions hardly figured any longer, these would be 
nominally present until the 6
th
 Congress in Austria in 1956, when FUENR became FUEN.  
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The Council of Europe offered at least some initial encouragement to FUEN, 
providing Skadegård with CHF 300,000 to support a fact-finding mission around Europe in 
1954-55. Skadegård succeeded in creating a network of contacts among different ethnic 
groups and widening FUEN membership, but the ultimate aim of building a case for a 
European Convention on Minority Protection remained unrealised(Kühl 2000: 68). Certainly 
at this time, FUEN’s emphasis on the collective rights of nationalities continued to be viewed 
by many Council of Europe member states as anachronistic and a reminder of a European 
past best forgotten. 
Such misgivings were heightened by FUEN’s admittance, during the 1950s, of the 
organisation representing Sudeten Germans expelled from Czechoslovakia after 1945, and by 
the participation within it of individuals previously associated with the development of 
particularistic völkisch German nationalism during the inter-war period. The latter included 
the Austrian academic and former Nazi Party member Theodor Veiter. This German presence 
strengthened perceived links to the pre-war Nationalities Congress, apparent not least in the 
decision to present FUEN’s new journal Europa Ethnica (launched in 1957) as the successor 
to the former Verband publication Nation und Staat(1927-1944).
35
 
This continuity element is central to the arguments of those who have branded FUEN 
a ‘pro-Nazi’ organisation.36 However, the archives reveal that the first editor of Europa 
Ethnica was in fact WaldemarQuaiser, a Sudeten German Social Democrat active in the pre-
war anti-Nazi resistance who had spent 1939-45 in Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp. In 
1936, Quaiser joined the Deutscher Verband zur nationalen Befriedigung Europas, a 
‘democratic minority-association’ established in Vienna by Paul Schiemann – “an almost 
unique personality with a rare political Fingerspitzengefühl and harmonious conception of 
Humanitas”.37 Even these credentials did not ease the misgivings of the “pro-European 
internationalist” Skadegård (Kühl 2000: 83), who chided the editor for his undue emphasis on 
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and polemical stance regarding German minorities in Eastern Europe.
38
 Referring to the pro-
Nazi orientation of Nation und Staat during the 1930s, Skadegård(quite literally) underlined 
that “it would represent the failure of our efforts if it were not now made clear that, in this 
respect, the new journal has nothing to do with the old times”.39 
For Skadegård, it seems,thevirulent anti-communism expressed by Quaiser, Veiter 
and otherswas at odds with his goal of achieving constructive working relationship with 
regimes behind the Iron Curtain, the better to support and engage with minorities living in 
these countries (ironically, this stance meant that FUEN was,on multiple occasions, also 
accused of being pro-Communist in orientation).
40
At the same time, the Secretary General 
clearly also entertained hopes of obtaining financial support for FUEN’s activities from a 
(decidedly waryand unforthcoming) federal government in Germany, and did not wish to be 
associated with activities that might be construed as going against German state interests.
41
 
For all of this caution, FUEN was, inevitably, caught in the crosshairs of Cold War 
propaganda. At the time of the 6
th
 FUEN Congress held in 1956 in Austria’s Slovene 
minority-inhabited region of Carinthia, for instance, a Klagenfurt-based newspaper 
SlovenskiVestnik questioned the organisation’s financial independence, while the Ljubljana-
based SlovenskiPoročevalec intimated that it served as a cover for ‘former Nazis and 
Fascists’.42 
Over time, however, the environment in Western Europe began to appear more 
propitious to FUEN’s goals, as states such as Belgium and Spain took steps to accommodate 
“ethno-regionalist” movements within their borders. Other governments, however, remained 
strongly resistant to acknowledging linguistic and cultural diversity, and fully four decades 
would elapse before the organisation realised its founding aim of attaining consultative status 
at the CoE. During these years, FUEN remained very much on the European fringe, with few 
resources of its own and only limited structures of opportunity upon which it could draw. 
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Also, while Veiter doubtless entertained his own ambitions in relation to the organisation, his 
1957 dismissal of FUEN’s leadership as “dilletantish”43perhaps carries some weight.This is 
especially so if one considers the prominence quickly attained by Minority Rights Group 
(MRG) International following its establishment in 1969. Unlike FUEN, arguably a true 
grassroots minority organisation, MRG claims to speak “on behalf of” rather than “for” 
minorities. Its regular expert reports and policy briefings nevertheless lent it a degree of 
visibility that FUEN manifestly lacked.  
In the course of its existence, FUEN has also had to compete for attention with 
language-advocacy organisations, such as the International Association for the Defence of 
Menaced Languages and Cultures, based in Belgium, and the Dublin-based European Bureau 
of Lesser Used Languages (EBLUL). Unlike FUEN, EBLUL received not only recognition 
but also permanent funding from the EEC.
44
 Claims limited to the protection of minority 
languages (especially smaller ones in danger of extinction) were, it seems, far more palatable 
to European institutions. This in turn suggests that the latter were still wedded to 
“representation of ethno-cultural differences within a nation as relatively superficial 
variations” rather than espousing the more substantial agenda of self-determination advanced 
by FUEN (Roshwald 2007: 367). 
The very fact that FUEN maintained its existence throughout the difficult post-war 
decades points to the continued existence of minority communities aspiring to greater 
recognition and self-determination. Nevertheless, by the end of the 1980s, the Union could 
count on no more than 25 full and affiliate member organisations, nearly all of which spoke 
on behalf of minority communities in Western Europe. The core of active members was 
smaller still, and drawn mainly from South Tyrol and the Danish-German border region. 
When the long-cherished (and hard-fought for) goal of consultative status was finally realised 
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in January 1989, FUEN had by this point – in Kühl’s words – an “old and tired face” (Kühl 
2000: 106). 
Just a few months later, however, the organisation’s fortunes were boosted by the 
demise of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. This paved the way for a 
revival of minority claims within the region as well as new contacts across the former West-
East divide, leading to a doubling of FUEN’s membership within a decade.45Thisexpansion 
not only significantly widened FUEN’s agenda and mandate, but also reconfigured its 
relationship with European structures. A fringe organisation representing peripheral ethnic 
groups was transformed into a pan-European umbrella organisation for minorities, making it 
much harder to ignore.  
More significantly, the proliferation of ethnic conflict following the collapse of the 
Communist bloc brought the internationalisation of minority rights back onto the European 
political agenda. This was signalled by the CSCE Charter of Paris for a New Europe in 
November 1990 and the 1991 follow-up report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National 
Minorities, which discussed proposals put forward by FUEN and announced that “issues 
concerning national minorities, as well as compliance with international obligations and 
commitments concerning the rights of persons belonging to them, are matters of legitimate 
international concern and consequently do not constitute exclusively an internal affair of the 
respective State”.46The CSCE Copenhagen Document of 1990 introduced detailed provisions 
for national minorities, setting the stage for most of the international legal instruments 
adopted since.  
For many nascent Eastern European minority communities, FUEN became a first 
point of contact with the wider world; ironically, after having been shunned by the EU 
institutions for decades, FUEN was now perceived – by national governments in Eastern 
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Europe – as a kind of EU proxy. For example, FUEN has been a long-term advocate for the 
rights of Crimean Tatars, whose representative body, the Mejlis, is among the Union’s 
members. FUEN’s 1996 fact-finding mission to Crimea and ensuing recommendations, it is 
argued, were important in signalling to the Ukrainian authorities “the growing presence of the 
Crimean Tatars on the international arena”(Stewart 2005: 205-206).47 
FUEN also claims to have had a hand in the development of the 1992 Council of Europe’s 
European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (ECRML) andits 1995 FCNM, 
which incorporates many of the points made in FUEN’s own Cottbus Declaration of 1992 
(Hansen 2009: 5). FUEN’s former chairman, however, characterised both ECRML and 
FCNM as “light products” that did not impose binding international legal obligations upon 
states. Similarly, the EU Copenhagen Criteria – while welcome –were open to the same 
charge of double standards levelled at the minority treaties between the wars, while no 
effective mechanisms were put in place to enforce them post-accession. Subsequent 
references to minority rights in the EU Lisbon Treaty and the European Charter for 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, meanwhile, have yet to acquire substance (Hansen 2009: 
4-5). Such a view informs FUEN’s continued vigorous lobbying efforts, as seen most 
recently in its ongoing citizens’ initiative for a Minority Safepack.  
 
Conclusions  
This article has drawn on archival resources to give a fuller picture of the background to 
current transnational minority rights activism in Europe, linkingthis to broader academic and 
policy debates on a European ‘minority question’which, despite frequent claims to the 
opposite, has neverquite gone away. In so doing, it offersa more nuanced appraisal of a field 
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of transnational minority action which, if considered at all, is generally greeted with 
suspicion.  
Today’sFederal Union of European Nationalitieshas, since its inception, framed the 
‘minority question’as a question of democratisation, decentralisation and finding anoptimum 
balance between the identity-based claims of ethnic groups and the sovereignty, stability and 
integrity of nation-states. Such a balance, it argues, can only be achieved through concerted 
international action within the framework of the European integration processes that inspired 
the creation of FUEN in the late 1940s. In the past three decades, at least,FUEN has done 
much to gain acceptance and credibility as an interlocutorin the international minority rights 
field. But,as the current Minority Safepack Initiativedemonstrates, the balance of power 
between state and minority actors remains firmly weighted in favour of the former, while the 
claims of the latter are still oftenviewed through the prism of security, as potentially 
disruptive to peace, stability and state integrity. 
Those who persistentlysecuritise the ‘minority question’take their cue from the 1930s, 
when a previous transnational initiative originating from civil society – the European 
Nationalities Congress - was subverted by the ‘homeland nationalism’ of the German state. 
FUEN has since suffered by association, being painted at various points in its almost 70-year 
history as no more than a cover organization for revisionist German nationalism. Our analysis 
has argued that the true line of continuity between the Congress and FUEN is to be found in 
the 1920s and the ideas of Schiemann, Laserson and other democratically-minded activists of 
the period. Like FUEN, the Nationalities Congress of the late 1920s was committed to 
working democratically within existing state structures to ensure a fuller voice and 
participation for minorities in decision-making related to their affairs.  
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While the inter-war discourse of minority rights ultimately fell prey to manipulation 
by state-directed German nationalism, it would be wrong to conflate the policies of an 
aggressive and expansionist Nazi dictatorship with those of the democratic Weimar Republic. 
In the 1920s, there was nothing inherently sinister or threatening in efforts by the German 
state to reach out and support German minority communities in East-Central Europe. To 
understand why the ENC increasingly looked to Germany, moreover, due consideration has 
to be given to the deficiencies of the LoN minority protection system and to an overall 
international environment in which transnational actors were never ‘likely to overcome 
hurdles otherwise posed by state-dominated domestic structures’(Risse-Kappen 1995: 6-7). 
By contrast, FUEN emerged within what was, by comparison, a more geopolitically 
stable context, and subsequently evolved against the background of a progressive 
consolidation of liberal democracy in Western Europe. In this setting, few eyebrows have 
been raised by Germany’s post-1989 efforts to engage with the ‘residual, though still large’ 
German minority in Eastern Europe.
48
By the same token, no-one would look askance at 
Denmark’s support for the Danish minority in South Schleswig, which, anchored in Bonn-
Copenhagen Declarations,proved so instrumental in the development of FUEN during the 
1950s. The processes of European integration that began after 1945 also provided FUEN with 
opportunity structures of which inter-war Congress activists could only dream, encouraging 
decentralisation within states and openingup new institutional arenas within which social 
movements can interact transnationally and pursue common goals. 
49
 
For all this, it took FUEN decades of perseverance before its efforts were finally 
rewarded by the participatory and consultative status in Council of Europe, United Nations, 
and the Fundamental Rights Platform. Moreover, even now, ‘participation’ should not be 
taken to imply effective ‘voice’. Today, growing pressures for a “renationalisation of the 
continent” in the face of economic crisis and burgeoning Euroscepticism stand to increase 
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rather than diminish the securitization of ethnic diversity. This is all the more so given 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea (condemned by FUEN) and deployment of a “kin-state” 
nationalism that aspires to “diasporise” minorities and instrumentalise ethnicity in the 
interests of state power and domestic political legitimacy of ruling elites.
50
 The current 
Minority Safepack Initiative will perhaps first and foremost serve as a test of FUEN’s 
organisational capacities and its representativeness in the eyes of the communities it purports 
to speak for. However, if the Initiative does go forward, it will also be a proving stone for 
whether European institutions are as ready for more direct input from minority organisations 
as they claim to be.Our analysis suggests that the longer-term sustainability of the European 
project would be best servedby the former. For, the experience of ENC tells us that trans-
ethnic coalition building in the interestsof peace and democracy needs to be underpinned by 
credible support from non-partisan, supranational players – something that both the Council 
of Europe and the European Unionhave always aspired to be. 
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